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TITLE VII DISPARATE IMPACT 
SUITS AGAINST STATE GOVERNMENTS 
AFTER HIBBS AND LANE 
CLAUDE PLATTON 
INTRODUCTION 
The disparate impact theory of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 19641 enables employees and job applicants to challenge 
employment practices that, although neutral on their face, have a 
disproportionate, adverse effect on the basis of race, sex, or national 
origin.2 It permits challenges to a wide variety of employment 
practices—including standardized tests, diploma requirements, height 
and weight requirements, and subjective evaluations—that have stood 
in the way of equal access to the workplace and to advancement.3 The 
theory has been available to private- and public-sector employees 
alike since 1973.4 
In recent years, the Supreme Court’s “federalism revolution” has 
narrowed Congress’s ability to override state sovereign immunity 
with civil rights legislation.5 As a result, whether Congress retains the 
power to authorize Title VII suits against state governments has 
 
Copyright © 2005 by Claude Platton. 
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000). Title VII targets discrimination on the basis of 
race, national origin, sex, and religion in the employment context. Id. § 2000e-2(a). Religious 
discrimination presents unique issues and is not discussed in this Note. 
 2. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 4.01, at 235 (3d ed. 2002). The other major theory under Title VII is disparate 
treatment, which requires proof of intent to discriminate. Id. 
 3. Id. § 4.02, at 249–53. 
 4. Congress extended Title VII to state and local government employment as part of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 701, 86 Stat. 103, 103 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1972)). 
 5. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001) 
(discussing the Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence, including its expansion of state 
sovereign immunity). 
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become uncertain.6 The Court recognized in 1976, in Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, that Title VII abrogates state sovereign immunity.7 Although 
several subsequent federalism decisions have reaffirmed that 
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity through its 
enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,8 the stringent abrogation analysis applied in those cases 
undermined the holding in Fitzpatrick and cast doubt upon Title VII’s 
future as a remedy for state employment discrimination.9 
In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,10 however, 
the Supreme Court, for the first time since reinvigorating the state 
sovereign immunity doctrine, upheld a federal statute against a 
sovereign immunity challenge, concluding that state employees could 
sue their employers for violating the family-leave provision of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).11 The following year, in 
Tennessee v. Lane,12 the Court upheld the private suit provision of 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against a state 
sovereign immunity challenge.13 Because of the similarities between 
these statutes and Title VII, commentators have concluded that these 
cases put Title VII’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity on much 
firmer doctrinal footing.14 It is less clear, however, that these cases 
authorize disparate impact suits against state governments.15 Because 
disparate impact liability arises from conduct that would not be 
 
 6. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 244; Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 
Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 19–21 (2003). 
 7. 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (citing Fitzpatrick for the proposition that “the Eleventh Amendment, and 
the principle of state sovereign immunity which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the 
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000) (same); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (same). 
 9. See infra Part I.A. 
 10. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 11. Id. at 740. 
 12. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 13. Id. at 533–34. 
 14. See, e.g., Post, supra note 6, at 21–23 (discussing the import of Hibbs for Title VII). 
 15. See, e.g., Nicole E. Grodner, Note, Disparate Impact Legislation and Abrogation of the 
States’ Sovereign Immunity After Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs and 
Tennessee v. Lane, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1173, 1212–23 (2005) (arguing that Title VII’s disparate 
impact theory does not abrogate state sovereign immunity after Hibbs and Lane). 
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unconstitutional under equal protection analysis,16 the theory may 
exceed Congress’s remedial power under Section Five even if other 
aspects of Title VII do not. 
This Note argues that Hibbs and Lane establish beyond 
peradventure that Title VII’s disparate impact theory validly 
abrogates state sovereign immunity. Far from doctrinal aberrations, 
these two cases carry forward suggestions in the Supreme Court’s 
earlier state sovereign immunity cases that racial, gender, and 
national-origin discrimination call for a different, more nuanced 
abrogation analysis—one that recognizes that discrimination takes 
many forms and that is more deferential to Congress’s chosen means 
of responding to it. Under the logic of Hibbs and Lane, Title VII’s 
disparate impact provision is an appropriate legislative response to 
this country’s long history of discrimination against women and racial 
and ethnic minorities, and it applies to government and private 
employers alike. 
Part I of this Note provides background, briefly describing both 
the Supreme Court’s state sovereign immunity jurisprudence and 
Title VII disparate impact claims. It also discusses several pre-Hibbs 
lower court decisions considering whether Title VII disparate impact 
claims abrogate state sovereign immunity. Part II explains that Title 
VII satisfies the first of the two major requirements for abrogation, 
that Congress enacted the legislation in response to a pattern of 
unconstitutional discrimination. It also considers why the Court in 
Hibbs announced a new way of assessing the sufficiency of the 
legislative record. Finally, Part III shows that disparate impact 
satisfies the second major requirement for abrogation, that the 
remedy chosen be congruent and proportional to the pattern of 
unconstitutional discrimination. Although the disparate impact 
theory prohibits conduct that is not itself unconstitutional, Hibbs and 
Lane signal that Congress may enact broad prophylactic legislation to 
prevent infringement of rights that receive heightened scrutiny. Part 
III also argues that defining the disparate impact theory broadly, 
rather than merely as a remedy for intentional discrimination, is 
essential if the theory is to achieve remedial objectives. 
 
 16. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that equal protection 
claims require proof of discriminatory intent). 
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I.  BACKGROUND: STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY  
AND DISPARATE IMPACT 
This Part first outlines the requirements for congressional 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity, focusing on the aspects of the 
analysis most relevant to evaluating the disparate impact theory. It 
then briefly describes the theory and some key statutory features. 
Finally, it reviews several lower court decisions that, in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s pre-Hibbs state sovereign immunity decisions, 
grappled with the question of whether Title VII, and specifically its 
disparate impact provision, could abrogate the states’ newly 
strengthened sovereign immunity. 
A. Congressional Power and State Sovereign Immunity 
Congress may override the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity17 to suits for money damages only when it legislates 
pursuant to its power under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.18 Congress’s Section Five power, however, only 
authorizes legislation that “enforces” the guarantees of Section One 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as the Supreme Court itself has 
defined them.19 The Court has rebuffed congressional efforts to 
increase the level of protection that rights would receive under 
Section One, explaining that Congress may not use its remedial 
powers to “redefine” the meaning of the amendment.20 The Court has 
 
 17. The Eleventh Amendment provides, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has held that the Amendment also applies to suits by 
citizens against their own states. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 
(2001); see id. (“The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting 
States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.”). 
 18. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to 
its power under the Commerce Clause). Title VII’s application to private employers is an 
exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.3, at 257–58 (2d ed. 2002).; cf. 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (holding that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as applied to a private business, was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964) (same). 
 19. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 20. The Court has held that several federal antidiscrimination statutes are not valid 
exercises of Congress’s Section Five power. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (Title I of the ADA); 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA)); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)). 
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developed a three-step inquiry with which to determine whether a 
statute authorizing private suits against state governments is valid 
Section Five legislation.21 These steps are as follows: first, identify the 
right at issue;22 second, determine whether there is a “history and 
pattern” of state discrimination infringing this right;23 and third, assess 
whether Congress’s chosen remedy is a “congruent and proportional” 
response to this history and pattern of discrimination.24 This Section 
will briefly consider the first step of the inquiry and then turn to the 
second and third steps in greater detail. 
The first step identifies “with some precision” the right that the 
statute aims to protect and determines the level of scrutiny that courts 
show to the right.25 The Court has invalidated two antidiscrimination 
statutes protecting rights that courts review under a rational basis 
standard. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,26 the Court concluded 
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) implicated 
the right to be free of unconstitutional age discrimination, a right that 
receives only rational basis review.27 Similarly, in Board of Trustees of 
the University of Alabama v. Garrett,28 the Court held that Title I of 
the ADA implicated the right to be free of disability discrimination, 
which also receives rational basis review.29 In both cases, the Court 
noted that under this minimal standard of review, a court would find 
very little discriminatory conduct unconstitutional—only conduct that 
is “irrational.”30 
In contrast, the Court upheld two statutes in which the right at 
issue received heightened scrutiny. In Hibbs, the Court determined 
that the FMLA’s family-leave provision aimed to protect “the right to 
 
 21. An additional requirement is that Congress must have made unmistakably clear its 
intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73. This requirement is not at 
issue with respect to Title VII, which clearly was intended to apply to the states. Fitzpatrick, 427 
U.S. at 447. 
 22. See infra notes 25–34 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 24. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 25. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. 
 26. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 27. Id. at 83. 
 28. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 29. Id. at 366–68. 
 30. Id. at 368; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (“States may discriminate on the basis of age 
without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.”). 
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be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace,”31 and in 
Lane, it held that Title II of the ADA implicated the right to be free 
of disability discrimination that would infringe the fundamental right 
of access to the courts.32 Because the rights at issue in these cases 
receive heightened scrutiny, a great deal of conduct that infringes 
them would be unconstitutional.33 The level of scrutiny the right 
receives is crucially important to the second and third steps of the 
abrogation inquiry. 
1. The Requirement of a History and Pattern of Discrimination.  
In the second step, courts review a statute’s legislative record to 
determine whether it contains sufficient evidence of a history and 
pattern of discrimination to justify remedial legislation abrogating 
state sovereign immunity.34 When the right implicated by the statute is 
one that courts review under a rational basis standard, the record 
review is stringent and courts approach the evidence of 
unconstitutional state conduct skeptically. In Garrett, the Court 
credited only legislative evidence directly demonstrating disability 
discrimination by the states.35 It rejected, as irrelevant, evidence of 
disability discrimination in the private sector and in local government 
employment.36 Moreover, when rational basis review is implicated, 
the evidence of unconstitutional state conduct must be extensive and 
clear. For example, the Court concluded in Garrett that Congress had 
documented relatively few incidents of unconstitutional 
discrimination, despite holding extensive hearings on disability 
discrimination, and that these few incidents failed to establish a 
pattern of state discrimination.37 The Court also discounted a number 
 
 31. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003). 
 32. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522–23 (2004). 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Parties who seek to 
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive 
justification’ for that action.”). 
 34. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368. 
 35. Id. at 369. 
 36. Id. Similarly, the Court discounted evidence of unconstitutional state conduct in public 
accommodations, which it considered irrelevant because Title I specifically addresses disability 
discrimination in employment. Id. at 371 n.7. 
 37. See id. at 370 (noting that Congress had found, in enacting the ADA, that 43 million 
Americans have one or more disabilities and that in 1990 state governments employed 4.5 
million people, and observing that “[i]t is telling, we think, that given these large numbers, 
Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in 
employment against the disabled”). 
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of incidents of discrimination against disabled state employees 
because it found them insufficiently detailed to permit the conclusion 
that they described irrational, unconstitutional conduct rather than 
rational unwillingness to make accommodations.38 Similarly, the 
Court concluded in Kimel that Congress had not documented 
sufficient evidence of age discrimination by state employers to justify 
a legislative remedy.39 It made a similar determination in City of 
Boerne v. Flores40 regarding state infringement of the right to free 
exercise of religion.41 
Review of the legislative record is less stringent when Congress 
seeks to protect a right that courts review under a heightened-scrutiny 
standard. In Hibbs, the FMLA satisfied the record requirement even 
though the evidence before Congress of unconstitutional gender-
based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits was not 
significantly more extensive or detailed than the evidence found 
inadequate in Garrett.42 The Court credited evidence that it would 
have rejected under Garrett, such as gender-based disparities in 
private-sector family-leave policies.43 It also validated Congress’s 
concern that “stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation of family 
duties” produce such disparities.44 As Justice Kennedy objected in 
dissent, little of this evidence directly established that the states were 
responsible for unconstitutional discrimination.45 Similarly, in Lane, 
the Court relied upon “statistical, legislative, and anecdotal evidence 
of the widespread exclusion of persons with disabilities from the 
enjoyment of public services” without inquiring as deeply as it had in 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. See 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (“A review of the ADEA’s legislative record as a whole . . . 
reveals that Congress had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were 
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age.”). 
 40. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 41. Id. at 530 (“RFRA’s legislative record lacks examples of modern instances of generally 
applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry.”). 
 42. In Lane, the Court noted that the legislative record supporting the FMLA in Hibbs 
“contained little specific evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on the part of 
the States.” 541 U.S. 509, 528 n.16 (2004). 
 43. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730–31 (2003) (attributing 
disparities in private-sector leave policies to public-sector employment on the basis of evidence 
before Congress that public-sector and private-sector leave policies were substantially similar). 
 44. Id. at 730. 
 45. Id. at 749–50 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 519 (“We upheld the 
FMLA as a valid exercise of Congress’ § 5 power to combat unconstitutional sex discrimination, 
even though there was no suggestion that the State’s leave policy was adopted or applied with a 
discriminatory purpose.”). 
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Garrett whether this evidence proved unconstitutional conduct by the 
states.46 
In both Hibbs and Lane, the Court referred to its own prior 
decisions involving the right implicated by the statute and read these 
cases as further evidence of a history and pattern of discrimination. In 
Hibbs, the Court used its jurisprudence to help establish that 
Congress was justified in enacting legislation to combat gender 
discrimination.47 Lane reviewed prior cases dealing with state 
discrimination against the disabled and found that they documented 
“pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services 
and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental 
rights” that supported the enactment of the ADA.48 As the Court 
explained in Hibbs, the history and pattern of state constitutional 
violations that the record-review inquiry seeks to uncover is closely 
related to heightened scrutiny under equal protection.49 Affording a 
right the protection of heightened scrutiny, then, is the Court’s own 
response to clear evidence of a history and pattern of government 
discrimination against a protected group. The fact of heightened 
scrutiny, therefore, resolves in advance the question that the record 
review seeks to answer;50 thus, a more deferential, less exacting form 
of review is appropriate for legislation protecting rights that receive 
heightened scrutiny. 
 
 46. 541 U.S. at 529. 
 47. 538 U.S. at 730, 736. 
 48. 541 U.S. at 524. 
 49. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 (“The long and extensive history of sex discrimination 
prompted us to hold that measures that differentiate on the basis of gender warrant heightened 
scrutiny.”). The Court had already acknowledged the history of race and gender discrimination 
and, in Kimel, drawn a link between this history and heightened scrutiny. Contrasting the 
heightened scrutiny shown to race and gender classifications with the more relaxed scrutiny 
applied to classifications based on age, the Court in Kimel made the following observation: 
“Older persons, . . . unlike those who suffer discrimination on the basis of race or gender, have 
not been subjected to a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment.’” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)). 
 50. Note that this analysis formulates the right at a higher level of abstraction than 
authorized under Kimel and Garrett. That is, the Court did not consider whether its 
jurisprudence revealed a history of gender-based discrimination in employment. Instead, it 
considered gender-based discrimination generally. This less-precise analysis is easy to criticize if 
one starts from the assumption that the Court was performing the same analysis in Hibbs as in 
Garrett. This more abstracted form of analysis makes more sense, however, if, as discussed in 
Part II.B. infra, the Court was really establishing a different form of record review for rights that 
receive heightened scrutiny. 
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2. The Congruence and Proportionality Requirement.  The third 
step of the abrogation inquiry considers whether Congress’s chosen 
remedy is congruent and proportional to the history and pattern of 
discrimination.51 This inquiry distinguishes between legislation that 
remedies violations of constitutional rights and legislation that 
attempts to redefine the scope of the right itself.52 To deter or remedy 
violations of a right effectively, Congress may prohibit some conduct 
that would not itself be held unconstitutional under equal protection 
doctrine.53 A statute that prohibits a great deal of conduct that would 
not be unconstitutional, however, may be out of proportion to the 
constitutional violation it purports to remedy and may instead 
represent an attempt to redefine the right itself.54 Applying the 
congruence and proportionality test, the Supreme Court has held that 
the ADEA and ADA are not congruent and proportional responses 
to unconstitutional state discrimination against, respectively, older 
persons and persons with disabilities.55 In Kimel, the Court 
invalidated the ADEA’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
because it “prohibit[ed] substantially more state employment 
decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional 
under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.”56 
Rather than enforcing the constitutional prohibition on age 
discrimination in employment, the ADEA “effectively elevated the 
standard for analyzing age discrimination to heightened scrutiny.”57 
The Court analyzed Title I of the ADA in Garrett similarly: by 
prohibiting disability discrimination and mandating accommodation 
of employees’ disabilities, Title I prohibited far more conduct than 
would be unconstitutional under equal protection analysis and 
imposed a significant burden on state governments.58 
 
 51. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
 52. Id. In Boerne, the Court invalidated RFRA, which had mandated strict scrutiny for 
facially neutral laws that substantially burdened the free exercise of religion. RFRA would have 
worked a dramatic change in the protection afforded to the free exercise right and could have 
affected every aspect of state government operations. Id. at 532. Thus, it was not remedial 
legislation because it was grossly disproportionate to the relatively insignificant problem of 
facially neutral laws burdening the exercise of religion. Id. 
 53. Id. at 518. 
 54. Id. at 518–20. 
 55. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372–73 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000). 
 56. 528 U.S. at 86. 
 57. Id. at 88. 
 58. 531 U.S. at 372. 
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When the statute in question aims to protect a right that receives 
heightened scrutiny, however, Congress has significantly greater 
latitude to prohibit conduct that would not be unconstitutional. In 
Hibbs, the Court upheld the provision of the FMLA authorizing 
private suits against state employers for failing to provide twelve 
weeks of unpaid leave annually to employees caring for ill spouses, 
children, or parents.59 The Court concluded that the provision was 
appropriate remedial legislation because it targeted the “formerly 
state-sanctioned stereotype that only women are responsible for 
family caregiving” that had led employers to discriminate against 
women in hiring and promotion.60 In Lane, the Court sanctioned 
another remedy against state governments: Title II of the ADA’s 
requirement that states accommodate disabilities if failing to do so 
would burden disabled persons’ fundamental right of access to the 
courts.61 
B. Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision 
Broadly speaking, there are two theories of liability under Title 
VII.62 The first theory, disparate treatment, prohibits intentional 
discrimination;63 liability requires proof of discriminatory animus.64 
Under the second theory, disparate impact, an employer may be 
liable if it makes use of an employment practice that, although 
seemingly neutral, has a disproportionately adverse effect on one of 
the groups protected by the statute.65 The employer need not have 
 
 59. 538 U.S. at 724–25. 
 60. Id. at 737. 
 61. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531–34, 532 n.20 (2004). In Lane, the respondents 
were paraplegics unable to access courthouses that were not wheelchair accessible. Id. at 513–
14. Respondent Lane was unable to appear in court to face criminal charges and had to crawl up 
two flights of stairs. Id. at 514. Respondent Jones was a court reporter who was unable to access 
a number of county courthouses, and thus she “lost both work and an opportunity to participate 
in the judicial process.” Id. 
 62. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 38. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. (“Intent, purpose, or state of mind is crucial to . . . disparate treatment 
[claims].”). 
 65. See id. at 43 (“The Supreme Court has said that disparate impact discrimination 
‘involve[s] employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups 
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business 
necessity.’” (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977))). 
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been motivated by discriminatory animus; what matters is the 
practice’s effect.66 
The disparate impact theory was not explicitly part of Title VII 
as originally enacted.67 Rather, the Supreme Court established the 
theory in 1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,68 based upon its 
understanding of the language and purpose of the statute.69 The 
theory was used for several decades, with Griggs as its doctrinal 
underpinning, until Congress codified it as part of Title VII in the 
Civil Rights Act of 199170 in response to several Supreme Court 
decisions significantly narrowing the theory’s scope.71 As enacted in 
1964, Title VII did not apply to state and local government 
employers; Congress amended the statute to cover them as part of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA).72 
Griggs involved a Title VII disparate treatment suit by African-
American employees who challenged their employer’s practice of 
requiring high school diplomas and intelligence tests for placement in 
any but its lowest-paying department.73 The employer had openly 
discriminated against African-American employees prior to the 
effective date of Title VII and had added the intelligence-test and 
diploma requirements on the day Title VII went into effect.74 These 
requirements had the effect of disproportionately limiting African-
American employees to the lowest-paying department, thus 
 
 66. See id. (“Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required under a disparate impact 
theory.” (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977))). 
 67. Id. § 1.03, at 5. 
 68. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 69. See id. at 429–30 (“The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain 
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and 
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees 
over other employees.”); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (“When an 
employer uses a non-job-related barrier in order to deny a minority or woman applicant 
employment or promotion, and that barrier has a significant adverse effect on minorities or 
women, then the applicant has been deprived of an employment opportunity ‘because of . . . 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 
1964 § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000)). 
 70. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75 (codified as amended at  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000)). 
 71. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court significantly 
weakened the disparate impact theory. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 240–41. 
 72. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 701, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(2000)). 
 73. 401 U.S. at 427–28. 
 74. Id. 
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preserving the effects of the company’s pre–Title VII discriminatory 
practices.75 Nevertheless, the district court found that the company 
had no intention to discriminate, and it dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
claim.76 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title VII 
“proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are 
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is 
business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to 
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, 
the practice is prohibited.”77 The employer had failed to show that 
either its diploma or intelligence-test requirement bore “a 
demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for 
which it was used.”78 According to the Court, “absence of 
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or 
testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority 
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”79 
As the language of Griggs indicates, the primary purpose of the 
disparate impact theory is to remove barriers to employment 
opportunity that disproportionately burden women or racial or ethnic 
minorities.80 It is available to challenge both objective employment 
standards, such as standardized tests, and also subjective practices, 
such as job interviews, in which supervisors’ exercise of discretion has 
a disparate impact.81 The theory has been used to challenge a wide 
range of employment practices, including (although not always 
successfully) policies against hiring persons with arrest or conviction 
records, interviews, experience requirements, no-spouse rules, and 
no-beard policies.82 
 
 75. Id. at 430. 
 76. Id. at 428. 
 77. Id. at 431. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 432. 
 80. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (noting the Court’s conclusion in 
Griggs that in enacting Title VII, Congress’s primary objective was “to achieve equality of 
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other employees” (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–
30)). 
 81. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.02, at 251–53; see infra notes 173–77 and 
accompanying text. 
 82. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.02, at 251. 
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Since Griggs, a tripartite structure of proof has emerged for 
disparate impact claims.83 A plaintiff must put forward a prima facie 
case by identifying a particular employment practice that, although 
facially neutral, has a disproportionate, adverse impact on a protected 
group.84 Generally, plaintiffs bringing disparate impact claims must 
not only show that a protected group is underrepresented in the 
employer’s workforce, but also must identify the specific practice that 
gives rise to the discrepancy.85 The defendant may then attempt to 
rebut the prima facie case86 or else show, as an affirmative defense, 
that the practice is “job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity.”87 Finally, if the employer proves 
this defense, the plaintiff may yet prevail by showing that the 
employer refuses to adopt an “alternative employment practice” that 
would have a less-discriminatory effect.88 Such a showing undermines 
the employer’s claim that the practice is a business necessity.89 It also 
may suggest that the employer’s claim of business necessity is a 
pretext for intentional discrimination.90 
C. Lower Court Challenges to Title VII’s Abrogation of State 
Sovereign Immunity 
Although the Supreme Court held in 1976 that Title VII 
abrogated state sovereign immunity,91 lower courts heard new 
 
 83. Id. § 4.01, at 239. This structure of proof is now part of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (2000). 
 84. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 239. 
 85. Id. § 4.02, at 246–49. The exception is when “the plaintiff can prove that the elements of 
an employer’s selection process are incapable of separation for analysis.” Id. at 246. 
 86. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 338–39 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the 
result and concurring in part) (“[T]he defendants . . . . may endeavor to impeach the reliability 
of the [plaintiffs’] statistical evidence, . . . offer rebutting evidence, or . . . disparage . . . the 
probative weight [that the] evidence should be accorded.”). 
 87. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 239. Title VII does not define “job related” or 
“business necessity.” Id. at 242. Congress’s Interpretive Memorandum to accompany the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 states only that these terms retain their meaning prior to the Supreme 
Court’s 1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Id. § 4.03, at 
285–86. In practice, courts have applied the standard with varying degrees of stringency. Id. at 
289–93. That Congress, in codifying the theory, specifically rejected the Court’s weak 
articulation of the standard in Wards Cove suggests that the required showing is fairly stringent. 
Id. at 289. 
 88. Id. § 4.01, at 242–43. 
 89. Id. § 4.03, at 294. 
 90. Id. at 293–94. 
 91. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1976). 
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challenges to Title VII in the wake of the Court’s decisions 
reinvigorating state sovereign immunity and contracting the scope of 
Congress’s Section Five power. Following these decisions, three 
federal courts of appeals have considered, and upheld, Title VII’s 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity; two of them specifically 
decided challenges to abrogation in the context of disparate impact 
claims.92 The ways in which these courts reconciled the disparate 
impact theory with the abrogation inquiry, however, are somewhat 
troubling, because they may signal a narrowing of the theory’s scope. 
All three courts held that Congress had extended Title VII to the 
states in response to evidence of a pattern of discrimination in state 
employment. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit, in In re 
Employment Discrimination Litigation Against Alabama93 cited the 
EEOA’s legislative history, which “documented the troubling 
persistence of race discrimination in public employment”;94 the court 
also took notice of “this nation’s sad history of racial domination and 
subordination.”95 Because the court was writing before Garrett, which 
announced the rigorous record-review inquiry,96 this limited review of 
Title VII’s legislative history is unsurprising. The Eighth Circuit, in 
Okruhlik v. University of Arkansas,97 however, reached the same 
result after Garrett. The court cited the same legislative history as had 
the Eleventh Circuit and additionally cited the Senate’s floor 
debates.98 It further noted that when Congress extended Title VII to 
the states it was also gathering evidence regarding gender 
discrimination for other pending civil rights provisions, including the 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and Education Opportunity Act.99 
The court therefore concluded that Congress had had before it 
 
 92. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in In re Employment Discrimination Litigation Against 
Alabama involved challenges to a number of Alabama’s employment practices alleged to have a 
disparate impact on African Americans. 198 F.3d 1305, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 1999). The claims the 
Eighth Circuit considered in Okruhlik v. University of Arkansas included a female professor’s 
allegation of disparate impact on the basis of sex. 255 F.3d 615, 620 (8th Cir. 2001). And the 
Seventh Circuit in Nanda v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois evaluated a 
professor’s disparate treatment suit alleging race, sex, and national-origin discrimination. 303 
F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 93. 198 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 94. Id. at 1323. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
 97. 255 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 98. Id. at 625. 
 99. Id. 
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evidence of a history and pattern of both race and gender 
discrimination.100 The Seventh Circuit, in Nanda v. Board of Trustees 
of the University of Illinois,101 followed Okruhlik in taking notice of 
the other legislation pending before Congress when the EEOA was 
enacted. Additionally, it found support in “the well-documented 
history of gender [and race] discrimination in this Nation . . . that is 
embodied in the Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence.”102 
The Eleventh and Eighth Circuits, the two courts of appeals to 
consider state sovereign immunity challenges to the disparate impact 
theory, applied the congruence and proportionality analysis in 
somewhat different ways. The Eleventh Circuit characterized the 
disparate impact theory as a remedy for covert intentional 
discrimination that would be difficult to prove under the disparate 
treatment theory.103 The court explained that “[alt]hough the plaintiff 
is never explicitly required to demonstrate discriminatory motive, a 
genuine finding of disparate impact can be highly probative of the 
employer’s motive.”104 Therefore, the court concluded, 
Our analysis of the mechanics of a disparate impact claim has led us 
unavoidably to the conclusion that although the form of the 
disparate impact inquiry differs from that used in a case challenging 
state action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, the core 
injury targeted by both methods of analysis remains the same: 
intentional discrimination.105 
The court thus found that Title VII’s disparate impact provision, as a 
remedy for intentional discrimination that is difficult to prove, was a 
congruent and proportional response to intentional discrimination.106 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that “employment practices, 
adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in 
operation be functionally equivalent to [unconstitutional] intentional 
discrimination . . . [and] may have effects that are indistinguishable 
 
 100. Id. at 624. 
 101. 303 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 102. Id. at 830–31 (quoting Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927, 936 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 103. In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
 104. Id. at 1321. 
 105. Id. at 1322. 
 106. Id. at 1323–24. 
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from intentionally discriminatory practices.”107 Therefore, the court 
held, the disparate impact theory was a “‘prophylactic’ response to a 
pattern of unconstitutional state action [that] is proportional and 
congruent.”108 The court did not explain precisely what this 
conceptualization entails; the Supreme Court, in the opinion from 
which this characterization of disparate impact is taken, indicated that 
it may include both practices that perpetuate the effects of historical 
discrimination and those that rely on unconscious stereotypes.109 
Thus, both circuits were able to find a rationale, prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Hibbs and Lane, for concluding that 
Title VII’s disparate impact theory satisfied the congruence and 
proportionality test. Neither court explored in any depth what effect 
defining disparate impact in terms of intentional discrimination—
either as a remedy for intentional discrimination that is difficult to 
prove, or as a remedy for conduct that is the “functional equivalent” 
of intentional discrimination—would have on how the theory 
operates. As discussed in Part III, there is some reason to think that 
these conceptualizations, particularly the Eleventh Circuit’s, may 
significantly limit the disparate impact theory’s reach. 
II.  THE RECORD-REVIEW INQUIRY 
No court reviewing Title VII has yet performed an extensive 
review of its legislative record.110 This Part shows that this record 
satisfies the more deferential review shown to rights that receive 
heightened scrutiny: Congress extended Title VII to the states in 
response to evidence of race, gender, and national-origin 
discrimination by state employers. This Part then turns to the record-
review inquiry itself and considers why the Court established this 
second form of review in Hibbs. It concludes that the continued 
viability of the state sovereign immunity doctrine required that it do 
so: not only would the Garrett test’s skepticism be incongruous when 
the rights involved have been judicially recognized as important, but 
the test also would have put the Court in the awkward position of 
 
 107. Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255 F.3d 615, 626 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987, 990 (1988)). 
 108. Id. at 626–27. 
 109. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988); see infra notes 173–
78 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra notes 93–102 and accompanying text. 
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having to disbelieve that the states have ever discriminated on the 
basis of race, gender, or national origin. 
A. Title VII’s Legislative Record 
Review of Title VII’s legislative record reveals that when 
Congress extended Title VII to the states it was responding to a 
perceived nationwide pattern of unequal employment opportunity for 
women and for racial and ethnic minorities—a pattern that resulted, 
in significant part, from intentional discrimination. In extending Title 
VII, Congress relied in large part on a report by the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights111 regarding racial and national-origin 
discrimination in state and local government employment.112 
According to the House Committee on Education and Labor, the 
Commission’s report documented that “widespread discrimination 
against minorities exists in State and local government employment, 
and that the existence of this discrimination is perpetuated by the 
presence of both institutional and overt discriminatory practices.”113 
The Committee noted that “[t]he report cites widespread 
perpetuation of past discriminatory practices through de facto 
segregated job ladders, invalid selection techniques, and stereotyped 
misconceptions by supervisors regarding minority group 
capabilities.”114 Moreover, the report found that “employment 
discrimination in State and local governments is more pervasive than 
in the private sector.”115 
The Commission’s report, which studied state and local 
government employment in seven large metropolitan areas, recorded 
instances of intentional discrimination as well as discriminatory 
attitudes among supervisors and institutionalized barriers to equal 
 
 111. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE . . . BY ALL THE PEOPLE: A 
REPORT ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT 
(1969). 
 112. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 17–18 (1971), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, S. 
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 77–78 (1972) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT]. A second Commission report 
cited by Congress found that Mexican Americans were underrepresented in law enforcement 
agencies in the southwestern United States. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN 
AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST 78–83 (1970). 
 113. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 17. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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opportunity. Although the Commission found that “blatant racism 
openly admitted by a public official [was] atypical,” it encountered 
“[s]egregated facilities, segregated work assignments, social ostracism, 
and lack of courtesy” in government employment.116 It also observed 
that government officials commonly expressed indifference to issues 
of equal employment opportunity, particularly in the context of 
promotions, and it further determined that administrators of merit-
based promotion systems “frequently violated the merit principle and 
practiced conscious, even institutionalized, discrimination.”117 The 
report found that African Americans, and to a lesser extent Latinos, 
faired poorly compared to their white counterparts in obtaining the 
more desirable jobs in state government.118 
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare also 
reviewed a Census Bureau report showing that “while some progress 
has been made toward bettering the economic position of the 
Nation’s black population, the avowed goal of social and economic 
equality is not yet anywhere near a reality.”119 According to the 
report, African Americans in 1970 were “concentrated in the lower-
paying, less prestigious positions in industry and [were] largely 
precluded from advancement to the higher paid, more prestigious 
positions.”120 The unemployment rate for African Americans was also 
considerably higher than that of whites.121 The report observed that 
average pay among Latinos was also lower than for whites and that 
Latinos had higher rates of unemployment than whites.122 On the basis 
of all of these findings, Congress was justified in concluding that it 
was faced with a pervasive problem of state race and national-origin 
discrimination. 
Congress also had before it evidence regarding gender-based 
employment discrimination. Research conducted by the Department 
 
 116. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 111, at 61. 
 117. Id. at 64. 
 118. The report noted that African Americans were “noticeably absent from managerial and 
professional jobs” except in a few fields, notably health and welfare. Latinos, although more 
successful in obtaining higher-level positions than African Americans (who held the majority of 
laborer and other low-level positions), had been “less successful than majority group members.” 
Id. at 118–19. 
 119. S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 6 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT, supra note 112, at 415. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 6–7. 
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of Labor’s Women’s Bureau showed that women received 
substantially lower salaries than their male counterparts for 
comparable work.123 Moreover, far fewer women had earnings in the 
highest pay bracket recognized in the survey.124 The House 
Committee on Education and Labor concluded that “[w]omen are 
subject to economic deprivation as a class. Their self-fulfillment and 
development is [sic] frustrated because of their sex. Numerous studies 
have shown that women are placed in the less challenging, the less 
responsible and the less remunerative positions on the basis of their 
sex alone.”125 Congress, on the basis of this evidence, concluded that 
“blatantly disparate treatment” persisted in employment,126 but did 
not draw specific conclusions about state governments.127 
Three aspects of the Court’s review of the FMLA’s legislative 
record in Hibbs are particularly relevant in assessing the adequacy of 
Title VII’s legislative record. First, the Court expanded the types of 
evidence that it would recognize as suggestive of discrimination. It 
cited approvingly statistical evidence of disparities, such as research 
indicating that many private employers offered family leave only to 
female employees; under the Garrett test, such evidence would be 
 
 123. Id. at 7. 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 4 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT, supra note 112, at 2140. 
 125. Id. The Committee did not introduce these “numerous studies” into the legislative 
record. 
 126. Id. at 64. The Committee noted that this discrimination “is particularly objectionable in 
view of the fact that Title VII has specifically prohibited sex discrimination since its enactment 
in 1964.” Id. at 64–65. 
 127. Thus, Title VII’s legislative record contained less evidence regarding gender 
discrimination than regarding racial and national-origin discrimination. As the Eighth Circuit 
noted, however, the same Congress that enacted the EEOA also passed the ERA. See supra 
notes 99–102 and accompanying text. The Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee held three days of hearings on the ERA in 1970, during which it 
“received testimony from 42 witnesses, received 75 additional insertions of material, and 
compiled a hearing record of almost 800 pages.” S. REP. NO. 92-689, at 4 (1972). The full 
Committee subsequently heard additional testimony. Id. In its report on the ERA, the Judiciary 
Committee cited examples of state gender discrimination, including the persistence of 
“protective” labor laws that barred women from performing certain tasks or holding certain 
positions. Id. at 9. Based upon this and other evidence, the Committee stated that “[s]ex 
discrimination is clearly present even in government employment.” Id. It noted that women 
disproportionately occupied the lowest grades of federal civil service employment; although 
women filled 62 percent of the lower four employment grades, they constituted only 2.5 percent 
of the highest four grades. Id. Although the Supreme Court has never indicated whether 
evidence compiled for contemporaneous legislative action can be considered in the record-
review inquiry, the Eighth Circuit’s decision to take note of the legislative record of the ERA 
seems reasonable. 
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irrelevant both because it does not offer direct evidence of 
unconstitutional conduct and because it does not directly implicate 
state-government conduct.128 This suggests that, in extending Title 
VII, Congress was justified in relying not only upon direct evidence of 
intentional discrimination by state governments, but also upon the 
voluminous numerical data it had collected regarding segregation and 
disparities in both government and private-sector employment. In 
particular, Congress justifiably relied upon data showing that female 
employees were paid less than men and that African-American 
employees tended to hold lower-paying and less-prestigious positions 
than white workers. 
Second, the Court in Hibbs permitted Congress to draw 
inferences about discrimination from the data before it.129 Its review 
of maternity-leave statutes revealed that only eleven states offered 
male and female employees different amounts of leave. Similarly, its 
review of family-leave statutes showed that only seven states offered 
childcare leave to women but not to men.130 A number of states, 
however, did not guarantee family leave to any employees, relying 
instead on voluntary or discretionary leave programs, and Congress 
had received evidence that such discretionary policies could “leave[] 
‘employees open to discretionary and possibly unequal treatment.’”131 
The Court permitted Congress to infer, from this potential for 
discrimination, that “even where state laws and policies are not 
facially discriminatory, they [are] applied in discriminatory ways.”132 
 
 128. The Court connected this private-sector data to state employment by citing a “50-state 
survey also before Congress [that] demonstrated that ‘[t]he proportion and construction of leave 
policies available to public sector employees differs little from those offered private sector 
employees.’” Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 n.3 (2003) (quoting The 
Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor-
Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the H. Comm. on Education 
and Labor, 99th Cong. 33 (1986) (statement of Meryl Frank, director of the Yale Bush Center 
Infant Care Leave Project)). 
 129. The Hibbs opinion on several occasions expressed deference toward, or even approval 
of, the inferences Congress had drawn from the evidence before it. See id. at 734 (“Congress 
could reasonably conclude that such discretionary family-leave programs would do little to 
combat the stereotypes about the roles of male and female employees . . . .”); id. (“[F]our states 
provided leave only through administrative regulations or personnel policies, which Congress 
could reasonably conclude offered significantly less firm protection than a federal law.”). 
 130. Id. at 733–34. 
 131. Id. at 732–33 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 2, at 10–11 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 18). 
 132. Id. at 732. The Court indicated that this inference was justified because Congress had 
heard testimony that “[t]he lack of uniform parental and medical leave policies in the work 
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This deference to congressional inferences is important for Title VII. 
In extending Title VII to the states, Congress inferred a broad pattern 
of discrimination by combining documented instances of intentional 
discrimination by state governments with extensive numerical 
evidence of race- and gender-based disparities in pay and promotions. 
The Court in Hibbs approved this kind of legislative reasoning. 
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, the Court in Hibbs 
concluded that its own gender-discrimination jurisprudence could 
provide evidence of a history and pattern of state gender 
discrimination.133 Because Title VII targets race, gender, and national-
origin discrimination, all of which receive heightened scrutiny under 
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence,134 this doctrinal 
shift has great import for Title VII. The Court specifically indicated in 
Hibbs that it would review Title VII in the context of its prior cases: 
after reviewing its gender-discrimination jurisprudence, the Court 
concluded that “Congress responded to this history of discrimination 
by abrogating States’ sovereign immunity in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.”135 When the substantial legislative record of state 
discrimination is read against the backdrop of the Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence, Title VII is on solid ground. 
B. The Need for Two Tiers of Record Review 
After Hibbs, there are two forms of record-review inquiry: one 
for rights that receive only rational basis review and another for rights 
that receive heightened scrutiny. This revision of the sovereign 
immunity doctrine was necessary because the Garrett record-review 
inquiry is inadequate when applied to rights that receive heightened 
scrutiny. In several of its recent federalism cases, the Court has 
indicated that at least certain key antidiscrimination statutes, such as 
 
place has created an environment where [sex] discrimination is rampant.” Id. (quoting The 
Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, 
Drugs and Alcoholism of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., pt. 2, at 
170 (testimony of Peggy Montes, Mayor’s Commission on Women’s Affairs, City of Chicago) 
(alteration in original)). 
 133. The Court had also looked to its own jurisprudence in Kimel and Garrett, but in those 
cases the result of this inquiry was to confirm that Congress was attempting to provide state 
employees with far more protection than the Court would offer them under the Equal 
Protection Clause. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
 134. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 9.1, at 645. 
 135. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729. 
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the Voting Rights Act, validly abrogate state sovereign immunity.136 
In Garrett, however, the Court established a doctrinal test that was 
flawed in two ways. First, the test is weighted too heavily against 
abrogation, perhaps making abrogation impossible even when the 
legislation under review is truly responsive to a history and pattern of 
discrimination. Second, applied to a statute like Title VII, the test 
would put the Court in the politically and intellectually awkward 
position of doubting that the states had ever been involved in 
pervasive racial, gender, and national-origin discrimination. 
First, the Garrett record review prevents Congress from offering 
additional protection to rights that the Court has decreed should 
receive only minimal scrutiny. Thus, although the test is neutral on its 
face—it merely inquires whether Congress documented a pattern of 
state violations of the specific constitutional right before attempting 
to abrogate state sovereign immunity—in effect it would invalidate 
most legislation protecting rights that receive only rational basis 
review. Although the Court has claimed that the Garrett test would be 
easier to satisfy for rights that receive heightened scrutiny,137 in 
practice heightened scrutiny would only make it more likely that 
apparently discriminatory conduct really represented unconstitutional 
conduct. It would not relieve Congress’s enormous burden of 
documenting a sufficiently large number of incidents of 
discrimination such that the Court would feel comfortable inferring a 
pattern. 
The problem with the Garrett inquiry is that there is no logical 
connection between a statute’s societal importance and the strength 
of its legislative record. Congress may have been entirely justified in 
enacting a core antidiscrimination statute and yet failed to place in 
the legislative record sufficiently detailed evidence with which the 
Court could “check Congress’s homework”138 years later.139 The 
 
 136. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) (comparing the 
ADA unfavorably to the Voting Rights Act (VRA)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
532–33 (1997) (comparing RFRA unfavorably to the VRA). 
 137. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (“[G]ender discrimination . . . triggers a heightened level of 
scrutiny. . . . [Thus] it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional 
violations.”). 
 138. This phrase is Justice Scalia’s description of the congruence and proportionality test. 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 558 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 139. Cf. Holmes v. Marion County, 349 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(“Although the Supreme Court has consistently limited its review to the legislative record we 
nonetheless assume that, if the history were written elsewhere for all to see, as the history of 
race and sex discrimination is, then the lack of a legislative record would not matter. . . . 
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Garrett test is a useful tool with which to constrain congressional 
decisionmaking. But if, as the Court had suggested, the Section Five 
power should be more expansive when Congress acts to remedy 
racial, gender, and national-origin discrimination, the Court needed a 
different doctrinal tool with which to review these statutes. The Court 
provided this tool in Hibbs by establishing a more lenient form of 
record-review inquiry. 
Second, the Garrett test poses a question that the Court would 
find difficult to ask with regard to race, gender, or national-origin 
discrimination: whether Congress had a sufficient basis for believing 
that states are responsible for unconstitutional discrimination.140 It 
was politically and doctrinally acceptable in Garrett for the Court to 
engage in a rigorous and highly skeptical review of Congress’s 
assertion that states discriminate against disabled workers.141 It was 
also acceptable for it to speak of rational disability discrimination142 
and to doubt the contention that states’ refusal to accommodate the 
disabled in public facilities bears on the question of whether they 
discriminate against the disabled in the workplace.143 With a statute 
aimed at race, gender, or national-origin discrimination, however, 
such doctrinal skepticism would be troubling; state discrimination 
against women and racial and ethnic minorities is unquestionably part 
of this nation’s history. The Hibbs test, by reviewing the legislative 
record more generously and taking notice of equal protection 
jurisprudence, relieves the Court of having to ask whether Congress 
has a basis for believing that racial, gender, or national-origin 
discrimination are really problems in need of a remedy. 
 
Legislative power under § 5 depends on the state of the world, not the state of the 
Congressional Record.” (citation omitted)). 
 140. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 141. Professor Post argues that Hibbs was intended to avoid the political controversy that 
would have resulted from invalidation of Title VII’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity: 
In the years since Boerne the Court has used its new enforcement model of Section 5 
power primarily to invalidate statutes of relatively low political salience. The nation’s 
conviction that an essential mission of the federal government is the prevention of 
racial and gender discrimination . . . . would be forcefully challenged were the Court 
to hold that important dimensions of Title VII were beyond Congress’s Section 5 
power. 
Post, supra note 6, at 22–23. Post is likely right about the political stakes. The focus in this Note, 
however, is on the doctrinal incongruity of doubting, and requiring Congress to prove, that the 
states ever practiced racial, gender, and national-origin discrimination. 
 142. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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III.  TITLE VII DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY’S CONGRUENCE AND 
PROPORTIONALITY 
After Hibbs and Lane, Congress may use its Section Five power 
to provide broad remedies for discrimination against women and 
racial and ethnic minorities, and it has significant discretion in 
selecting those remedies. This Part argues that Title VII’s disparate 
impact theory is within Congress’s Section Five power to enact 
prophylactic legislation and that a disparate impact-based remedy is 
congruent and proportional even when not narrowly defined as 
merely a remedy for hard-to-prove intentional discrimination. First, 
this Part shows that Hibbs recognized that forms of discrimination 
other than intentional constitutional violations are legitimate targets 
of Section Five legislation, and it explains that, under this reasoning, 
prohibiting employment practices that have a disparate impact is a 
legitimate congressional goal. It then shows that disparate impact is 
similar to the remedies found congruent and proportional in Hibbs 
and Lane. Finally, it examines the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
disparate impact theory outside the state sovereign immunity context 
and argues that a broad conception of disparate impact, not defined 
merely as a remedy for covert intentional discrimination, is essential 
if the theory is to achieve its remedial purposes. 
A. Hibbs and Forms of Discrimination 
In Hibbs, the Court affirmed that even gender discrimination 
that would not be unconstitutional can be worthy of legislative 
response; Hibbs authorizes Congress to target neutral practices that 
have a disparate impact. The Court took seriously—and affirmed that 
Congress may target with its Section Five power—entrenched social 
roles and unexamined attitudes that have tangible effects on women’s 
employment, even if those effects are only remotely connected to 
unconstitutional discrimination: 
Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel 
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. 
Because employers continued to regard the family as the woman’s 
domain, they often denied men similar accommodations or 
discouraged them from taking leave. These mutually reinforcing 
stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that 
forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family 
caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views about 
women’s commitment to work and their value as employees. Those 
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perceptions, in turn, Congress reasoned, lead to subtle 
discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case 
basis.144 
It is not clear how the Court’s “subtle discrimination” is related to 
intentional discrimination; “subtle” is not a word normally used to 
describe the overt intent to discriminate that the Court requires to 
establish an equal protection violation.145 Assuming that the Court is 
referring to intentional discrimination, however, the line of causation 
through which “stereotypes about women’s domestic roles” produce 
this subtle discrimination is, as the Court described it in Hibbs, 
remarkably long. Thus, even if intentional discrimination is the 
Court’s ultimate concern, Congress may address the underlying social 
processes that produce it rather than just punishing it after it occurs.146 
Of course, beginning with City of Boerne, the Court indicated 
that the congruence and proportionality test would afford Congress 
greater legislative flexibility to deter or remedy violations of the most 
important rights: “The appropriateness of remedial measures must be 
considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate 
to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, 
lesser one.”147 Thus, when Congress acts to deter or remedy violations 
of a right that receives heightened scrutiny, it should be able to enact 
a statute that prohibits more constitutional conduct than when it acts 
to protect a right that receives only rational basis review. Before 
Hibbs, however, the Court had not made clear how much more 
authority Congress would have. The Court’s discussion of gender-
based stereotypes in Hibbs reveals how much more authority 
Congress possesses when heightened scrutiny is implicated. The 
congruence and proportionality test requires that the ultimate target 
of Section Five legislation be intentional discrimination. After Hibbs, 
however, Congress may deter this discrimination by targeting its roots 
in stereotypes and unconscious attitudes. 
 
 144. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003). 
 145. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) 
(explaining that disparate treatment analysis fails to reflect accurately the psychological 
processes that produce most “intentional” discrimination). 
 146. In Lane, the Court seemed to reaffirm this principle: “When Congress seeks to remedy 
or prevent unconstitutional discrimination, § 5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation 
proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic 
objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004). 
 147. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (citation omitted). 
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Moreover, Hibbs strongly indicates that the remedy need not be 
aimed, even indirectly, at intentional discrimination. The Court made 
clear that Congress prevents employers from offering no family leave 
at all, a practice that would have a disparate impact on women: 
[I]n light of the evidence before Congress, a statute mirroring Title 
VII that simply mandated gender equality in the administration of 
leave benefits, would not have achieved Congress’ remedial object. 
Such a law would allow States to provide for no family leave at all. 
Where “[t]wo-thirds of the nonprofessional caregivers for older, 
chronically ill, or disabled persons are working women,” and state 
practices continue to reinforce the stereotype of women as 
caregivers, such a policy would exclude far more women than men 
from the workplace.148 
There is no indication, in this passage, that the target of the remedy 
must be intentional discrimination, even via a long causal chain. If 
Congress perceives that failure to provide family leave will 
disproportionately affect female employees, it may provide a remedy. 
Thus, Hibbs authorizes Congress to target either the deep roots 
of intentional discrimination or practices with a disparate impact. 
Under either reading, Hibbs announces a remarkably expansive 
congruence and proportionality standard that has great significance 
for Title VII’s disparate impact theory. Disparate impact aims at 
effects and is agnostic about the motivations behind them.149 Thus, 
under a more cramped congruence and proportionality analysis, this 
lack of concern on intent would be a significant shortcoming.150 Under 
the more expansive analysis outlined in Hibbs, however, legislation 
aimed at protecting a right that receives heightened scrutiny need not 
directly target unconstitutional conduct. Just as the FMLA’s family-
leave provision was not, on its face, concerned with remedying 
intentional (gender-based discriminatory) conduct, but rather 
targeted conduct far down the line of causation, Title VII’s disparate 
impact provision need not aim at intentional discrimination to be a 
congruent and proportional remedy. Although surely there must be 
some limits to the attenuation of the connection, Hibbs shows that 
these limits will not be strict: so long as the theory targets practices 
 
 148. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738 (citation omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 1, at 24 
(1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 18). 
 149. See infra Part III.C. 
 150. Indeed, the Court in Garrett rejected disparate impact liability as a remedy for 
disability discrimination. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372–73 (2001). 
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that are connected in some way to intentional discrimination, the 
congruence-and-proportionality requirement will be satisfied.151 
So even if the Hibbs congruence-and-proportionality 
requirement mandates conceptualizing disparate impact in a way that 
ties it to intentional discrimination, the connection can be so loose 
that it would not alter how the theory functions in practice. Hibbs 
thus provides a better rationale for disparate impact than either the 
Eleventh or Eighth Circuit could offer under the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court’s earlier Section Five decisions.152 The Eleventh 
Circuit’s conception of disparate impact as a remedy for intentional 
discrimination that would be difficult for plaintiffs to prove is far 
more limiting. Tying disparate impact so tightly to intentional 
discrimination risks limiting disparate impact’s usefulness in 
challenging practices that impose barriers through indifference, 
thoughtlessness, and unconscious stereotypes. Under the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach, courts may feel compelled to dismiss disparate 
impact claims that do not bear the “scent” of covert intentional 
discrimination.153 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit’s conceptualization of 
 
 151. There is no conflict between this expansive view of Congress’s power to target conduct 
that is not itself unconstitutional and the Court’s rejection of disparate impact liability under the 
Equal Protection Clause. When the Court rejected disparate impact liability under equal 
protection in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), it recognized that the theory would 
continue to be available through Title VII. See id. at 239 (“We have never held that the 
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to 
the standards applicable under Title VII . . . .”). Thus, Davis holds only that disparate impact is 
not authorized by Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment and does not address whether 
Congress may provide for disparate impact liability pursuant to its Section Five power. Indeed, 
the very existence of the congruence and proportionality test reveals that Section One and 
Section Five are not coextensive; if they were, there would be no reason to measure how much 
conduct Congress may prohibit that would not be unconstitutional under Section One. See City 
of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (“Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can 
fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct 
which is not itself unconstitutional . . . .”). Moreover, the Court was concerned in Davis that 
disparate impact liability could have dramatic, unforeseen societal consequences. See 426 U.S. at 
248 (concluding that the effects of recognizing a disparate impact theory “would be far reaching 
and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, 
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes” that disproportionately affect African 
Americans). This concern does not arise with regard to disparate impact liability under Title 
VII, which applies only in the employment context and has well-defined statutory parameters. 
See supra Part I.B. 
 152. See supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 452 (2000) (“If the 
conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit were taken seriously, it would suggest a fundamental 
reworking of an important area of Title VII jurisprudence.”). Professor Jolls, however, argues 
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disparate impact as the “functional equivalent” of intentional 
discrimination is less precise and, thus, likely would narrow the 
disparate impact theory less dramatically than would the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach. It faces a similar problem, however, in that it 
produces an expectation that disparate impact claims will be similar 
to claims of intentional discrimination. The disparate impact theory, 
instead, has always permitted challenges so long as a practice 
produces a disparate impact, even when an employer’s motivations 
appear entirely innocent.154 A theory targeting practices that are the 
functional equivalent of intentional discrimination is not as broad or 
as generally applicable as a theory that targets all disproportionately 
adverse effects. 
B. The Disparate Impact Remedy Compared with the FMLA and 
Title II of the ADA 
In addition to falling within the broad language of the Hibbs 
opinion, Title VII’s disparate impact theory is similar, in three key 
respects, to the remedies upheld in Hibbs and Lane. First, like the 
FMLA’s family-leave provision and the reasonable accommodation 
mandated by Title II of the ADA, disparate impact does not punish 
intentional discrimination, but rather imposes a duty on employers to 
ensure that protected groups are not disproportionately burdened by 
facially neutral policies. The Supreme Court explained in Hibbs that 
the family-leave requirement protected women from being harmed 
disproportionately by the absence of employer-provided leave 
policies.155 Congress was justified in imposing a requirement that 
employers offer their employees twelve weeks of leave as prophylaxis 
for the disparate impact that neutral leave policies would have on 
female employees. Disparate impact liability would target the same 
adverse effects as the FMLA’s leave policy, but in a less-intrusive 
way—by prohibiting the discriminatory policies directly rather than 
by setting a standard that overrides them. If Congress may take the 
more-intrusive step of imposing a mandatory leave policy to guard 
against leave policies that would have a disparate impact on women, 
 
that understanding disparate impact as a remedy for covert discrimination is compatible with a 
“robust conception” of the theory. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 642, 675 (2001). 
 154. See infra Part III.C. 
 155. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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it should be able to take the less-intrusive step of imposing liability on 
employers who employ such policies. 
Moreover, disparate impact is closely aligned with the reasonable 
accommodation upheld in Lane. Both remedies impose a duty over-
and-above the baseline duty to refrain from intentionally 
discriminating. Title II of the ADA requires governments to take 
affirmative steps to ease disabled persons’ access to courthouses; it 
does not inquire whether governments refrain from taking such steps 
out of discriminatory animus toward the disabled. Title II is thus 
agnostic toward questions of intent and focuses, instead, on effects in 
much the same way as disparate impact. Indeed, the Court in Lane 
acknowledged that the failure to accommodate and the maintenance 
of policies that have a disparate impact are closely related problems: 
“[F]ailure to accommodate persons with disabilities will often have 
the same practical effect as outright exclusion.”156 
Second, like both the FMLA’s family-leave provision and Title II 
of the ADA’s reasonable-accommodation requirement, disparate 
impact under Title VII displays legislative crafting that limits the 
burden it imposes. In Hibbs, the Court noted with approval a number 
of statutory limitations on the FMLA’s reach. These included the 
limited definition of covered employees; the requirement that 
employees give advance notice of foreseeable leave requests; the 
requirement that a health-care provider certify the need for leave; 
and the twelve-week limit on leave, which was a “middle ground” 
between the needs of employees and employers.157 Moreover, the 
damages available were “strictly defined and measured by actual 
monetary losses.”158 Similarly, in Lane, the Court emphasized that 
“[t]he remedy Congress chose is nevertheless a limited one.”159 
Reasonable accommodation “would not fundamentally alter the 
nature of the service provided,” and governments are not required to 
make accommodations that “would impose an undue financial or 
administrative burden.”160 
The disparate impact theory, as codified, incorporates the 
judicially developed tripartite structure of proof, including the 
business necessity defense, as well as the requirement that plaintiffs 
 
 156. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004). 
 157. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738–39 (2003). 
 158. Id. at 740. 
 159. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. 
 160. Id. at 532. 
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identify the specific employment practice responsible for the 
disparate impact.161 These limitations ensure that disparate impact 
liability is only imposed upon employers who refuse to abandon 
employment practices that clearly burden women or racial or ethnic 
minorities disproportionately. Moreover, disparate impact plaintiffs 
may not recover compensatory or punitive damages, but instead are 
limited to backpay, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief.162 This is a 
further indication that the theory is tailored to accomplish important 
ends without imposing an excessive burden on employers, who may 
not have been aware initially of their policies’ discriminatory effects. 
Finally, disparate impact, like the remedies in Hibbs and Lane, 
responds to the failure of prior efforts. The Court emphasized in both 
cases that more extensive remedies are justified by the failure of more 
limited previous efforts. In Hibbs, it noted that Congress had enacted 
the FMLA in the face of evidence that Title VII and the Pregnancy 
Disability Act had failed to address workplace gender discrimination 
fully: “Congress again confronted a ‘difficult and intractable 
proble[m]’ where previous legislative attempts had failed. Such 
problems may justify added prophylactic measures in response.”163 
Referring to this passage, the Court noted in Lane that Congress had 
enacted the ADA in the face of “considerable evidence of the 
shortcomings of previous legislative responses.”164 Title VII’s 
disparate impact theory, like the FMLA and Title II of the ADA, is 
an “added prophylactic measure” that was created in response to the 
failures of prior efforts. The Court itself created the remedy in 
response to evidence that employment practices imposing significant 
barriers to workplace equality were escaping the reach of Title VII’s 
disparate treatment theory.165 In sum, the disparate impact theory is 
similar in nature, scope, and purpose to the remedies upheld in Hibbs 
and Lane. 
C. The Value of a Broadly Defined Disparate Impact Theory 
Although the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits were able to find a 
doctrinal basis for upholding the disparate impact theory before 
 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000); see supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text. 
 162. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 241. 
 163. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000) 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
 164. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. 
 165. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
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Hibbs and Lane, they did so by defining the theory in terms of 
intentional discrimination; the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, in 
particular, seemed to reduce the theory to an “evidentiary dragnet” 
for detecting hidden intentional discrimination.166 As shown by the 
three decades of Supreme Court precedent dealing with disparate 
impact claims, the theory can only provide an effective remedy if it is 
broadly defined. The disparate impact theory is broad enough to 
reach a range of employment practices that, although outside the 
scope of the disparate treatment theory, nevertheless impose 
substantial barriers to equal employment opportunity. In particular, 
disparate impact has been used to target arbitrary employment 
practices that impose barriers to equal opportunity and practices that 
result from unconscious bias. Only if disparate impact has the same 
broad reach under Congress’s Section Five Power will the theory be a 
viable remedy for state employees. Moreover, a narrow disparate 
impact theory, conceived of solely as a remedy for intentional 
discrimination, would be unworkable in practice. 
From its inception, the disparate impact theory has been 
concerned with “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on 
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”167 Since 
Griggs, the theory has been important in cases involving arbitrary 
barriers in which probing for discriminatory animus would be neither 
practical nor meaningful. For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,168 a 
female applicant for a prison-guard position used the disparate 
impact theory to challenge statutory height and weight requirements 
 
 166. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 493, 518 (2003) (“[T]here has long been a dispute over whether disparate impact 
doctrine is an evidentiary dragnet designed to discover hidden instances of intentional 
discrimination or a more aggressive attempt to dismantle racial hierarchies regardless of 
whether anything like intentional discrimination is present.”); supra Part I.C. 
 167. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis added). The Court 
subsequently reaffirmed this conception of the theory in Connecticut v. Teal. See 457 U.S. 440, 
451 (1982) (“Title VII strives to achieve equality of opportunity by rooting out ‘artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary’ employer-created barriers to professional development that have a 
discriminatory impact upon individuals.”). This is not to say, however, that either the Court or 
Congress has ever settled upon a single conception of the theory. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra 
note 2, § 4.01, at 243 (noting that the “disparate impact theory remains a complicated and 
confusing doctrine”). Nevertheless, the conception of disparate impact as a means of achieving 
equal employment opportunity is a prominent one that is traceable to the theory’s origins in 
Griggs. 
 168. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
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that excluded many women, but almost no men.169 Because it was a 
disparate impact claim, the Court did not have to attempt to discern 
the motives of the Alabama legislators who had enacted these 
requirements. Not only would such an inquiry have been difficult, but 
it also would not have contributed much. In the face of evidence that 
the height and weight requirements would preclude more than 40 
percent of women, but less than one percent of men, from serving as 
prison guards,170 it matters little whether the legislature intended to 
exclude women or simply acted without considering the 
disproportionate burden these requirements would impose. What the 
plaintiff in Dothard sought, and won, was a new policy that would 
measure the characteristics that prison guards must possess without 
unnecessarily screening out qualified female applicants.171 Because the 
purpose of the litigation was to remove barriers to equal employment 
rather than to punish the employer for discriminating, there was little 
reason to require proof that the state had acted out of discriminatory 
motives once the existence of the barriers was established.172 This 
salutary change in policy was only possible because the disparate 
impact theory is not tethered to considerations of intent and can 
reach practices that impose arbitrary, rather than intentional, 
barriers. 
A broad disparate impact theory is also important because it can 
reach practices that, although imposing significant barriers to 
workplace equality, reflect unconscious bias rather than volitional 
discriminatory animus (and thus fall outside the ambit of disparate 
treatment). In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,173 an African-
 
 169. Id. at 323–24, 329–30 & n.12. The five-foot-two-inch height requirement would have 
excluded 33.29 percent of the state’s female population but only 2.35 percent of men. Id. 
Similarly, the 120-pound weight requirement would have prevented 22.29 percent of women, 
but only 3.63 percent of men, from working as guards. Id. 
 170. The two standards, when combined, would have excluded 41.13 percent of women in 
the state but less than 1 percent of men. Id. 
 171. For example, the Court held that a test that more directly measures strength would 
satisfy Title VII. Id. at 332. 
 172. One of the Court’s misgivings about disparate impact seems to be that it “would result 
in employers being potentially liable for ‘the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to 
statistical imbalances in the composition of their work forces.’” Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 
992 (1988) (plurality opinion)). The urge to link disparate impact to intentional discrimination 
may reflect the Court’s concern that disparate impact should not punish “innocent” employers. 
See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 173. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
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American bank employee was repeatedly passed over for supervisory 
positions in favor of white employees;174 the bank had never 
developed formal criteria for evaluating candidates for promotion, 
relying instead upon supervisors’ subjective assessments.175 Because 
the bank had been able to offer nondiscriminatory reasons for each of 
its promotion decisions, the lower courts had dismissed the plaintiff’s 
Title VII disparate treatment claims.176 The Supreme Court held, 
however, that the plaintiff could proceed under the disparate impact 
theory. Although subjective employment practices are not themselves 
objectionable, the Court explained, they may violate Title VII if their 
effects are “functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.”177 
Even if supervisors are not motivated by discriminatory animus in 
selecting candidates for promotion, unstructured subjective hiring 
practices may permit unconscious biases to distort the supervisors’ 
assessments: 
[E]ven if one assumed that [intentional] discrimination can be 
adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the 
problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain. 
In this case, for example, petitioner was apparently told at one point 
that the teller position was a big responsibility with “a lot of 
money . . . for blacks to have to count.” Such remarks may not prove 
discriminatory intent, but they do suggest a lingering form of the 
problem that Title VII was enacted to combat. If an employer’s 
undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the 
same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional 
discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII’s proscription 
against discriminatory actions should not apply.178 
The Court’s explicit recognition of the role of unconscious bias in 
employment decisions reveals the inadequacy of conceptions of 
disparate impact that view it as merely a remedy for covert 
intentional discrimination. As the Court described it, what was at 
work in Watson was not intentional discrimination, covert or 
otherwise. Rather, it was a neutral practice that nonetheless worked 
to exclude African Americans disproportionately from the 
supervisory ranks because it allowed unconscious biases to operate 
 
 174. Id. at 982. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 983–84. 
 177. Id. at 987. 
 178. Id. at 990–91 (citation omitted). 
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unchecked. Thus, if courts had to limit disparate impact to cases of 
covert discrimination, cases like Watson might not present valid Title 
VII claims. 
In addition to these conceptual reasons for a broad disparate 
impact theory, there are also practical reasons not to conceive of 
disparate impact as merely a remedy for covert intentional 
discrimination. Although states may raise Eleventh Amendment 
defenses early, often it will not be clear until well into the litigation 
process whether a facially neutral practice is the product of 
discriminatory animus. In Watson, for example, the district court 
conducted a full trial on the plaintiff’s disparate treatment claims 
before concluding that no intentional discrimination had occurred.179 
Thus, courts hearing disparate impact cases against state employers 
would have to defer ruling on Eleventh Amendment defenses until 
after hearing sufficient evidence from which to determine whether 
covert intentional discrimination was at work. It would be an 
enormous waste of judicial resources, and would be unfair to litigants, 
to let cases proceed to discovery, or even to trial, before deciding 
whether they should even have been brought in the first place. 
Although the Eleventh Circuit made clear that it would not require 
case-by-case findings of intent,180 there is no reason to suppose that 
other courts adopting its approach would not demand proof of intent 
in each individual case.181 
Courts also would have to make findings regarding intent on the 
basis of evidence ill-suited to the inquiry. The structure of proof in 
disparate impact cases aims to determine the effects of employment 
practices on protected groups and to assess whether these practices 
 
 179. Id. at 983–84. 
 180. In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1322 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
 181. An alternate reading of the Eleventh Circuit’s conception of disparate impact is that 
the court did not envision a case-by-case assessment of whether facially neutral practices reflect 
covert intent to discriminate. Rather, the court may have been suggesting that because some 
facially neutral practices that disproportionately burden protected groups are undoubtedly the 
product of discriminatory animus, and because it would be difficult in practice to identify these 
cases, the disparate impact theory should be available in all cases. This reading suggests a much 
broader conception of the theory. Because it permits disparate impact liability for many facially 
neutral practices that are not actually the product of intentional discrimination, it is a far 
broader prophylactic ban than one that only ferrets out the intentional discrimination lurking 
behind apparently neutral practices. Understood in this way, the Eleventh Circuit’s conception 
may, therefore, exceed the narrow definition of Congress’s Section Five power outlined in 
Garrett. Of course, it would fit comfortably within the Section Five power as conceived after 
Hibbs and Lane. 
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are justified.182 It does not offer the opportunity to delve into 
employers’ motives. In the course of hearing evidence about effects 
and justifications, however, courts hearing disparate impact claims 
would have to make findings as to whether a covert intent to 
discriminate was at work. The disparate treatment theory is better 
suited to this inquiry. Disparate impact’s structure of proof should be 
reserved for the inquiry it was designed to address—assessing 
whether neutral employment practices are justified—and should not 
be used to attempt to root out intentional discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hibbs and Lane give flesh to 
the suggestion in earlier cases that Congress has the power to respond 
in meaningful ways to racial, gender, and national-origin 
discrimination by state governments. In announcing a more nuanced 
and flexible standard for reviewing the legislative record and 
describing a more expansive view of Congress’s power to legislate 
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, these cases put 
Title VII’s disparate impact theory on much more solid doctrinal 
ground. It is now clear that the disparate impact theory can reach a 
wide range of state-government employment practices that, although 
constitutional, pose barriers to equal employment opportunity. 
The disparate impact theory is important both practically and 
symbolically. Although disparate impact cases are relatively 
infrequent,183 the theory remains an important tool with which to 
challenge arbitrary barriers to equal employment opportunity.184 It 
also embodies society’s commitment to opening workplaces to all 
persons, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender. For some time, it 
appeared that the Supreme Court would elevate the “dignity” of the 
states above Congress’s power to apply this core equal protection 
principle in state government workplaces. The Court has finally 
 
 182. See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Krieger, supra note 145, at 1162 n.3 (noting that far more disparate treatment 
claims than disparate impact claims are brought each year). 
 184. See Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s 
Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597, 600 (2004) (noting that 
“disparate impact litigation is not making a major impact in this new century” but arguing that 
“perhaps [the] most important[] reason that disparate impact litigation has been languishing is 
that its potential is not often appreciated by the practicing bar”). 
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reaffirmed in Hibbs and Lane, however, that it shares at least this 
basic commitment to equality. 
